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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
JEFFERY DEAN BAKER,

Case No. 18245

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, JEFFERY DEAN BAKER, appeals from
a conviction and judgment of Burglary, a felony of the
Third Degree, and Receiving Stolen Property, a Class B Misdemeanor,
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge,
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, JEFFERY DEAN BAKER, was charged
with Burglary, a felony of the third degree in violation
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, and Receiving Stolen Property, a Class
B Misdemeanor in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section
408 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, he was convicted
as charged in a jury trial and was sentenced to incarceration
at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as
provided by law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction for burglary
and a judgment rendered below and to have the case remanded to
the Third Judicial District for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 18, 1981 in the early morning hours the appellant
was arrested hiding inside of a Conoco service station located
at 904 South 1300 East in Salt Lake County.

(T. 18-19)

The appellant

had been an employee of that establishment for several weeks but
had been fired about three days prior to the arrest.

(T. 12, 22)

On the morning of the arrest of the appellant, the proprietor,
Keith Buchi, and police officers made a search of the building
after a neighbor reported noises. from the building.

Nothing

was discovered to be missing, however, a lock on a desk
drawer had been broken, the drawer opened and the papers
inside of the drawer scattered.

(T. 16)

No other property had

been moved or disturbed inside of the building.

(T. 20)

After

questioning by the police officers on the scene, the appellant
indicated that he had not done anything wrong but was just sleeping
in the building.

(T. 38)

In an unrelated incident in July of 1981, some
items were stolen from the bedroom of Amelia Van der Mulen.
(T. 27-28)

These included a driver's license, a visa banking

card, a savings deposit account book and a checking account
book.

(T. 28)

The appellant's vehicle was parked at the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

service station on September 18, 1981.

(T. 17)

The police officers

who responded to the alarm at the service station impounded the
vehicle and during the course of the impound the property taken
from Mrs. Van der Mulen was located in the vehicle (T. 34-35).
The appellant was questioned about the property and indicated that
he had found it in his driveway.

(T. 38)

He later indicated to

a police detective that the property had been found in a trash
can at the carwash near his home (T. 51).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
THE CRIME OF BURGLARY AND THE FAILURE OF THE COURT
TO SO INSTRUCT WHEN REQUESTED BY APPELLANT WAS
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Criminal Trespass is a necessary included offense of Burglary;
consequently the court's failure to instruct the jury on Criminal
Trespass constituted prejudicial error and the appellant's conviction
for burglary should be reversed and a new trial granted on that
charge.
The appellant requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on Criminal Trespass as a lesser included offense
to burglary.

In appellant's requested instructions an

instruction was requested on the offense of Criminal Trespass,
a Class B Misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2)(a)
(1953 as amended).

This requested instruction provided:

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you may find the defendant, JEFFERY
DEAN BAKER, guilty of the offense of Criminal Trespass,
a lesser and included offense of Count I of the
Information, the State must prove each and every
one of the following elements to your satisfaction
and beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That on or about September 18, 1981, Jeffery
Dean Baker entered or remained unlawfully on the
property of Keith Buchi; and
2. That in doing so Jeffery Dean Baker acted
with the intent to either:
(a) Cause annoyance to any person thereon,
or damage to any property thereon; or
(b) Commit any crime other than a theft or
a felony; and
3. That all such acts occurred in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
If the State has proved each and every one
of the elements described above to your satisfaction
and beyond a reasonable doubt then it is your duty
to find Jeffery Dean Baker guilty of the offense
of Criminal Trespass, a lesser and included offense
of Count I of the Information. However, if the
State has failed to prove any one of those elements
then you must find the defendant not guilty of
Count I of the Information.
The trial court refused to submit the requested instruction
on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to
the jury and appellant took proper exception to the court's
failure to so instruct the jury. 1 (T. 75)

1. Counsel for appellant requested the Instruction in writing and took
exception to the trial court's failure to give the request to the jury,
properly preserving this issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 51. State v. Erickson, 563 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977); State v. Bell, 563
P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); and State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d 149, 405 P.2d 793 (1965).
Accord: ,Rules of Practice in the District Courts, Rule 5.4.

-4-
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POINT A
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT TO
SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN
THE INSTRUCTIONS.
It has long been the law in the State of Utah,
that an accused in a criminal action has a right to submit
to the jury his theory of the case, and that such theory
when properly requested should be given to the jury in
the form of written instructions.
U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).

State v. Stenback, 78

In Utah this right allows

for the presentation of instructions on all defenses and
theories, including lesser included offenses, when such
are properly requested by the accused.

State v. Gillian,

23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson,
560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).
An accused may make the decision as a matter of
trial strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request
instructions on a lesser included offense if his theory
of defense so dictates.

State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335,

1337 (Utah 1977); State v. Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 152, 449
P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Valdez, 19 U.2d 426, 428, 432
P.2d 53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d
618 (1955); State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979).
However, when the accused as his theory of the case requests
instructions on lesser included offenses and is willing
to submit his guilt or innocence to the jury on that theory,
the trial court as a general rule is duty bound to submit
these alternatives to the trier of the fact.

State v.
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..
When the theory of defendant embaraces an argument,

in effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime
as charged in the Information but some lesser offense the
teachings of Gillian still apply.

On this point the court

stated:
One of the fundamental principles to.the submission
of issues to juries is that where the parties so
request they are entitled to have instruction given
on their theory of the case; and this includes
on lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the
evidence would support such a verdict . .
(State v. Gillian, supra, 23 U.2d at 374).
In Gillian this court pointed out the reasons for
this rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness
of such a rule.

This court said it

shoul~

not be the prerogative

of the trial court to direct the jury as to what degree
of crime they may find a defendant guilty or to direct
them that they must find him not guilty if they do not
find him guilty of the greater offense.

To allow this

permits the court to be a judge of the facts and to in
effect direct a verdict on the lesser included offenses.
Such a procedure violates the historical spirit as well
as letter of our system of jury trial under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of
Utah.

State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.

(Straup, J. concurring).

55 (1929)

See also Beck v. Alabama, 447

U.S. 625 (1980).
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POINT B
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF BURGLARY.
The test recently given to determine if one offense
is a lesser included offense of another is that found in
the Utah Criminal Code.

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953

as amended) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted
of both the offense charged· and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b} It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to connnit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute
as a lesser included offense.2
The process by which such a determination is made was described
in State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934):
The only way this matter may be determined is by
discovering all of the elements required by the
respective sections, comparing them and by a process
of inclusion and exclusion, determine those common
and those not common, and, if the greater offense
includes all legal and factual elements, it may
safely be said that the great includes the less,
if, however, the lesser offense requires the inclusion
of some necessary element or elements in order
to cover the completed offense, not so included
in the greater offense, then it may be safely said
that the lesser is not necessarily included in
the great.
(33 P. 2d at 645)

2.

This statute was relied upon as the test for one offense being a lesser

and included offense of another in State v. Lloyd, 568 P.2d 357 (Utah 1977)
and its companion case, State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) wherein
this Sponsored
court byheld
that the Utah joyriding statute is a lesser included offense
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Recently, in State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1097 (Ut. 1981),
this test was described then the following was quoted from
People v. Escarcega, 43 Cal. App. 3d 391, 117 Cal. Rptr.
595 (1974):
It is of no consequence that the evidence at trial
might also establish guilt of another and lesser
crime than that charged. As indicated, to constitute
a "lesser and necessarily included offense" it
must be of such a nature that as a matter of law
and considered in the abstract, the greater crime
as defined by statute or charged in the accusatory
pleading "cannot be committed without necessarily
committing [such other] offense". This rule has
been constantly reiterated . . . . The lesser offense
must "necessarily and at all time [be] included
within another one."
"If, in the commission
of acts made unlawful by one statute, the offender
.must always violate another, the one offense [i.e.,
the latter] is necessarily included in the other."
[Citations omitted; emphasis and bracketed language
in original. ]
The elements which must be proved to constitute
the crime of Burglary as described in Utah Code Ann. §766-202 (1953 as amended) are:
(1) A person must enter or remain in a building
or portion of a building;
(2)

The entry or presence is unlawful;

(3) The actor must possess the intent to commit
a felony, theft or assault.
There are two distinct offenses which constitute
the crime of Criminal Trespass as described in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended).

The elements of the

first type of Criminal Trespass as defined in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) are:

-8-
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(1)

A person enters or remains on property;

(2)

The entry or presence if unlawful;

(3) The actor possesses the intent to cause
annoyance, or commit a crime other than a theft
or a felony or the actor is reckless as to whether
his presence will cause fear for the safety of
another.3
·
The elements of the second type of Criminal Trespass are:
(1)

A person enters or remains on property;

(2)

The person knows his presence is unlawful;

(3) Notice against entry has been given by
personal coµununication or by a fence or enclosure,
or by posting signs.4
In comparing the statutes as Woolman advises the
first thing to ask is "can a Burglary be committed without
committing the offense of Criminal Trespass?"

If the answer

is "no" to commit a Burglary one must perforce commit a
Criminal Trespass, then Criminal Trespass is a lesser included
offense of Burglary.
35.

State v. Woolman, supra, 84 U. at

An important point of note is the provision of the

Criminal Trespass Statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2)
(1953 as amended), which states
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined
in sections 76-6-202, 76-2-203, 76-2-204 . . .
[Emphasis Supplied]

3. This was the character of the Crfurinal Trespass instruction requested
in appellant's proposed Instruction.
4.

This type of Criminal Trespass was not requested by appellant.

-9-
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The importance of this provision is that criminal
trespass requires proof of the same elements as are needed
to prove the-elements of the crime of burglary.

In other

words, criminal trespass is established by proof of less
than all of the facts required to establish the connnission
of burglary.
series

Obviously the legislative intent in this

of statutes is to make criminal trespass a lesser

included offense to the burglary statutes.

The acts to be proved
in the trespass and burglary statutes are identical. 5 Both
require one to enter or remain in a building and both require
that such entry or presence be unlawful.

The difference

in the statutes is that burglary requires a more specific
intent than criminal trespass.

In State v. Sunter, 550

P.2d 184 (Utah 1977), this court held that possession of
burglary tools, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended),
is not an included offense in the burglary statutes.

This

court went on to state that for an offense to be included
in

the greater offense of burglary, it must be embraced

within the legal definition of burglary, and that the gist
of the offense of burglary is the unlawful entry into a
building unlike possession of burglary tools which is a
possessory offense.

5. '!he legislature placed the burglary and criminal trespass statutes
in the sanE part of the code, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 et. seq. (1953 as
arrended), and provided comron definitions for both burglary and criminal
trespass in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as emended).

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (1979), the defendant
charged with burglary raised the defense of voluntary intoxication
and requested an instruction on criminal trespass which was denied.
On appeal the defendant claimed error in the failure to give the
instruction, but this court ruled that the defendant's lack of
intent was inconsistent with a request for an instruction on the
lesser offense.

Although the court did not expressly state that

criminal trespass is an included offense to the charge of burglary,
that holding seems implicit in the court's ruling that "the evidence
(including that presented by the defendant) establishes all of
the elements of burglary but did not establish all of the elements
of criminal trespass"

Ibid at 634.

In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the court
held that the trial court did.not err in refusing to reduce a charge
of burglary to criminal trespass.

The court noted that the element

of the intent of the person entering a building is the difference
between criminal trespass and burglary and the proof of that element
is oftentimes based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Such

a decision the court ruled was properly left to the trier of fact.
Nowhere in the opinion did the court mention that criminal trespass
is not an ·included offense to burglary.

Logically, this issue

must certainly have been resolved before the court could discuss
the propriety in the reduction of the charge based on sufficient
evidence.

So, by the implications to be drawn from the decision

made by this court in State v. Brooks, supra, this court has held
that criminal trespass is a lesser and inlcuded offense to a charge
of burglary.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The statutory history of the burglary and trespass sections
of the Utah Criminal Code also reflects. the fact that trespass
is a lesser included offense of burglary. Both provisions are
6
derived from the Texas Penal Code.
In Day v. State, 532 S.W.
2d 302 (Tex. 1976), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held
that a criminal trespass offense was a lesser included offense
to its burglary statute.

The Texas Court said:

As can be seen, the first three elements of each
of the three types of burglary and criminal_ trespass
are virtually identical. The fourth main element
of burglary, either the specific intent to commit
or the actual commission or attempted commission
of a felony or theft, deperl.ding on the type of
burglary involved, is absent from the offense of
criminal trespass. ( 532 S. W. 2d at 30 6) .
In similar circumstances wherein the prosecution was for
attempted burglary, the New York Court of Appeals also found
the failure of the trial court to instruct on the lesser included
offense of criminal trespass reversible error.

In People v.

Henderson, 41 N.Y. 2d 233, 359 N.E. 2d 1357 (1976) the court
reversing the attempted burglary conviction noted:
The test of whether a "lesser included offense"
is to be submitted is certainly not that it is
probable that the crime was actually committed
or even that there is substantial evidence to support
such a view. It suffices that it is supportable
on a rational basis or, put another way, by logical
necessity. To warrant a refusal to submit it

6. Jay Ba.mey, Utah Criminal Code Outline (1973). The Texas Code provisions
are in tum taken from the Model Penal Code Provision. See A.L.I. Model
Penal Code (P.O.D. 1962) §§ 221.0, 221.2.
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"every possible hypothesis" but guilt of the higher
crime must be excluded, [citations omitted], the
evidence for that purpose being required to be
considered in the light most favorable to the defendant
(People v. Battle, 22 N.Y. 2d 323, 292 N.Y.S. 2d
661, 239 N.E. 2d 535) since the jury is free to
accept or reject part or all of the defense or
prosecution's evidence [citations omitted].
The court's appraisal of the persuasiveness of
the evidence indicating guilt of the higher count
is irrelevant; the question simply is whether on
any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible
for the trier of the facts to acquit the defendant
on the higher count [citations omitted] and still
find him guilty on the lesser one. And it may
not be amiss to observe that at time, in their
projection of laymen's sensitivities to facts,
"juries may, on almost any excuse, convict of a
lower degree of crime although conviction of a
higher degree is clearly warranted" [citations
omitted] . . .
So tested, it must be concluded that, while on
the evidence here, though Henderson did not gain
entrance to the building (hence the charge of attempted
burglary) and fled when surprised by owner, the
jury nevertheless could have found an intent to
commit a larceny based upon circumstantial evidence
(See People v. Terry, 43 A.D. 2d_ 875, 351, N.Y.S.
2d 184), it could also have found that he lacked
the requisite intent at the time he broke the window
[citations omitted] . . . the jury could have decided
that he never intended to commit a larceny, but
rather was motivated by any one of a conceivable
number of other puproses such as for example, an
intent to bed down in the premiss, to obtain information,
or to engage in an act of mischief not larcenous
in nature -- all purposes, incidently, only somewhat
less rational than the one the People had asked
the jury to infer from the circumstantial evidence
in view of the fact that there was in this case
no direct or certain proof of the defendant's actual
purpose.
(459 N.E. 2d at 1360)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also held criminal
trespass to be a lesser included offense of burglary in construing
statutes akin to those found in Utah.
344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975). 7
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Undeniably, criminal trespass, as described in Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) is a lesser included offense
to the burglary provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, Utah Code
Ann. §§76-6-202, 76-6-203, 76-6-204 (1953 as amended).

POINT C
THE TRIAL COURT CO:MMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY REFUSING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
TRESPASS.
Because criminal trespass is a lesser included offense
of burglary under Utah's statutes, the issue that now must be
addressed -is:

when must the trial court instruct the jury on

such a lesser included offense?
This issue raised in this case has been before this court
on numerous occasions in the past and has, on occasion, brought
differing views from the members of this court.

The need that

such an instruction be given has been ruled to be a statutory
requirement.

The statute in force at the time of the appellant's

trial is found in Utah Code Ann. §77-34-2l(e) (1953 as amended),
which states:
The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the
offense charged or to any offense necessarily included
in the offense charged or an attempt to commit
either the offense charged or an offense necessarily
included therein.
A related provision was provided by the legislature in
the Criminal Code Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended)
which provides:
The court shall not be obligated to charge the
jury with respect to an included offense unless
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and conviction
him of the included offense. [Emphasis Supplied]
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The foregoing provision, as this court has noted, codifies
prior existing common law principles dating back to territorial
times in Utah.

People v. Robinson, 6 U. 101, 21 P. 403 (1889);

State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978).
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937), this
court stated that the failure to give an instruction on lesser
included offenses when requested "
rules of trial in criminal cases:

. clashes with two fundamental
It has the effect of the court

weighing the evidence and, in effect, limiting the jury to a
consideration of only part of the evidence (the defendant's):
and it, in effect, casts upon the accused the burden of proving
his innocence or justification."

65 P.2d at 1132.

The tenor of this court's discussions in the past.has been
that when the accused requests a lesser included instruction
there should exist a presumption that the requested instruction
be given. 8 In State v. Hymas, 64 U. 285, 230 P. 349 (1924),
it was stated:

This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. Gillian, supra,
23 U. 2d at 376 wherein it is said:

8.

The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge is to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, is that -we
review the record in the light favorable to the jury' s verdict.

However, in this situation where the question raised relates to
the refusal to subnit included offenses, it is our duty to survey
the whole evidence and the inferences.naturally to be deduced
therefrom to see whether there is any reasonable basis therein
which ~uld support a conviction of the lesser offenses.
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It is, however, always a delicate matter for a
trial court to withhold from the jury the right
to find the accused guilty of a lesser or included
offense, and determine the question of the state
of the evidence as matter of law. That should
be done only in very clear cases. ( 64 U. 2 at 287)
Accord: State v. Barkas, 91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d
1130 (1937).
In recent years this court has endeavored to set specific
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included offense
when requested.

The statutory necessity of instructing a jury

on a lesser included offense was described in State v. Dougherty,
550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976).

This court cited Lisby v. State, 83

Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), which followed a provision similar
to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-2l(e) (1953).

Describing the holding

of the Nevada Court this court said:
The Court discussed three situations in which the
problem of lesser included offenses are frequently
encountered. First, where there is evidence· which
would absolve the defendant from guilt of a greater
offense, or degree, but would support a finding
of guilt of a lesser offense, or degree; the instruction
is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not support a
finding of guilt in the commission of the lesser
offense or degree. For example, the defendant
denies any complicity in the crime charged, and
thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict;
or where the elements of the offenses differ, and
some element essential to the lesser offense is
either not proved or shown not to exist. This
second situation renders an instruction on a lesser
included offense erroneous, because it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where
the elements of the greater offense include all
elements of the lesser offense; because, by its
very nature, the greater offense could not have
been committed without defendant having the intent
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in doing the acts, which constitute the lesser
included offense. In such a situation instructions
on the lesser included offense may be given, because
all elements of the lesser offense have been given.
However, such an instruction may properly be refused
if the prosecution has met its burden of proof
on the greater offense, and there is no evidence
tending to reduce the greater offense. The court
concluded by stating that if there be any evidence,
however slight, on any reasonable theory of the·
case under which the defendant might be convicted
of a lesser included offense, the court must, if
requested give an appropriate instruction. 9
(550 P.2d at 176-177)
The question that arises then when lesser included instructions
are requested is:

was there " . . . any evidence, however slight,

on any reasonable theory under which the defendant might be convicted
of the lesser [and] included offense

. " of criminal trespass ..

State v. Dougherty, supra at 177; State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186,
188 (Utah 1977) (Justice Wilkins, concurring).

If there was

such evidence then the instructions were properly requested and
should have been submitted to the jury for consideration.
In State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), a criminal
trespass instruction was refused when the defendant was charged
with burglary and that ruling was upheld on appeal because the
court found that the evidence did not warrant the instruction.
The defendant had raised the defense of voluntary intoxication
and testified that he entered the building to search for friends.
He was found hiding in a closet and typwriters had been moved
to the point of entry.

9. The test given in State v. Dougherty, supra, has been followed in State
v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (Utah 1977), State v. Bell, 563P.2d186,
188 (Utah 1977), State v. Chestnut, 621P.2d1228 (Utah 1980), and State
v. Elliot, 641 P.2d l22 (Utah 1982).
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In this case the appellant was found by the police inside
of the building in question (T. 18-19).

He was not found in

possession of any property belonging to the business and in fact
no valuables had been moved even though the appellant had access
to them while in the building (T. 16,20).

Although a lock on

a desk drawer had been broken and the drawer opened and the contents
had been disturbed,nothing was taken from the drawer.

(T. 16)

Under these facts one reasonable theory would be that the appellant
did not have the intent to commit a theft when he unlawfully
entered the building or remained in it.

Consequently, under

the facts of this case the trial court committed error in failing
to_give the requested instruction of the lesser offense of criminal
trespass.
Appellant's actions in the instant easer are similar to
those of the accused in Crawford v. State, 241 N.E. 2d 795 (Indiana
1968).

In Crawford the accused was found hiding inside a building

at an unusual hour.

The Indiana Court in reversing his conviction

for burglary noted that his denial of intent to commit a theft
was sufficient to raise an issue as to such intent, 241 N.E.
2d at 797.

Although unauthorized entry into a building at an

unusual hour may give rise to an inference that the appellant
had the intent to commit a theft, it is by no means the one and
only reasonable inference that may be drawn from such evidence
State v. Brooks, supra.
Several cases

involv~ng

similar facts have required that

the charge of burglary be reduced to criminal trespass.

In State

v. Rood, 462 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1969) the defendant was seen inside
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
of Sponsored
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neighbor came to investigate the defendant fled.

The court held

that the State must prove that the defendant had the intent to
commit a specific crime to sustain the charge of burglary and
not just the intent to do some undetermined thing at the time
he was inside of the building.

Similarly, in State v. Kahinu,

53 Haw. 646, 500 P.2d 747 (Haw. 1972), the defendant was found
in the victim's hotel room, when asked what he was doing there
the defendant stated that it was his room and he then fled from
the hotel.

The court held that the mere fact that the entry

was forced or unlawful did not establish the requisite intent
for burglary.

The court then held that the evidence was insufficient

to establish a prima f acie case for burglary and the charge should
be reduced to criminal trespass.
When a court has erred by failing to give a requested instruction
the error is deemed to be prejudicial "if the requested instruction
had been given and the jury had so considered the evidence, there
is reasonable likelihood that it may have some effect on the
verdict rendered."

State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

The evidence offered in this case on the issue of intent was
all circumstantial.

It is quite reas.onable for the jury to infer

from this evidence that the appellant had some intent other than
to commit a theft when he entered the building.

This is especially

true when this court considers the holding of the courts in State
v. Rood, supra and State v. Kahinu, supra.

In light of those

holdings there is not only a reasonable likelihood that the verdict
would have been different had the jury been properly instructed,
but that
outcome would have been a distinct possibility. This
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is because the jury would not have to be asked to acquit the
appellant who was in Mr. Buchi's service station without permission
to be there, they could have found that he was guilty of the
lesser offense.
CONCLUSION
The offense of criminal trespass is a necessarily included
offense to the offense of burglary.
by proof of the same acts.
is the intent element.

Both offenses may be established

The only difference in the two offenses

Therefore, the trial court's refusal to

give the requested instruction was error.
in light of the facts of this case:

This error was prejudicial

even though the appellant

was arrested inside of the building, nothing had actually been
taken, although a desk drawer had been forced .open.

These facts

are, at best, equivocal on the element of intent to commit a theft,
as required to prove the offense of burglary.

Consequently, the

appellant's conviction for burglary must be reversed and the case
remanded to the District Court for a new triaL
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